“What do we gain by killing our brother and covering up his blood? Come, let us sell him to the Ishmaelites…” Parashat VaYishlah relates that Yehudah makes this suggestion after Reuven has succeeded in dissuading the brother from committing fratricide. The brothers had accepted Reuven’s argument and merely threw Yosef into a pit, rather than kill him. Just as they sit down to eat, a caravan passes by, and Yehudah seizes the opportunity to suggest that they sell Yosef rather than leave him in the pit to die.
There are a number of different reactions to Yehudah’s suggestion, one that saved Yosef from a painful death, but condemned him to a life of lonely servitude. Some midrashim are critical of his actions:
- He should have carried him home to his father on his shoulders (Bereishit Rabbah)
- Had he told his brothers to return Yosef to his father, they would have listened (Tanhuma)
This assessment of the situation emphasizes the weaknesses of Yehudah’s proposal, and the fact that his efforts on behalf of Yosef left much to be desired, as they did not make full use of his abilities and his status among the brothers.
The Gemara in Massechet Sanhedrin (6b) also appears critical of Yehudah’s actions. The Gemara is discussing the question of whether a rabbinic court should strive for a just ruling or encourage compromise. A number of different suggestions are raised in the course of this discussion. One the one hand, some sages rule that it is forbidden for the court to suggest a compromise. On the other hand, some argue that it would be a mitzvah for the court to have the adversaries agree to compromise.
Even among those who forbid compromise, different voices are heard:
Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: It is prohibited to mediate a dispute; and anyone who mediates [habotze’a] a dispute is a sinner; and anyone who blesses the mediator is cursing God. And of this, it is stated: “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord” (Psalms 10:3). Rather, the judge must assure that the true judgment will prevail at all costs and metaphorically pierce the mountain, as it is stated: “For the judgment is God’s” (Deuteronomy 1:17). And similarly, Moses would say: Let the judgment pierce the mountain. But by contrast, Aaron, whose role was not that of a judge, was a lover of peace and a pursuer of peace, and he would apply peace between one person and the other, as it is stated: “The law of truth was in his mouth, and unrighteousness was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and uprightness, and turned many away from iniquity” (Malachi 2:6).
Rabbi Eliezer says: If one stole a se’a of wheat and ground it and baked it and separated ḥalla from it, i.e., separated the portion of the dough that must be given to the priests, how can he possibly recite the blessing on the mitzva of ḥalla? He is not blessing; rather, he is cursing God. And of this offense it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: And whoever blesses upon breaking [botze’a] the bread despises the Lord.
Rabbi Meir says: The term botze’a employed in that verse was stated only with regard to Judah, as it is stated: “And Judah said to his brothers: What profit [betza] is it if we slay our brother and conceal his blood? Come, and let us sell him to the Ishmaelites” (Genesis 37:26–27). And consequently, anyone who blesses Judah for this act is cursing God, and of this it is stated: “And the covetous [uvotze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord,” interpreted homiletically as: “And whoever blesses the profiteer [botze’a] despises the Lord.”
We find here three homiletic interpretations of the verse in Tehillim 10:3 – “And the covetous [botze’a] blesses himself, though he despises the Lord.” According to the first approach, bringing the parties to compromise is sinful and against the dictates of God, Who demands justice. This view posits that the court is obligated to teach and carry out the will of God. It recognizes the place of Aharon who may encourage adversaries to work out their differences outside the courtroom. Once they have reached the court, however, its responsibilities are clear, and it may not stray from them.
The second approach, that of Rabbi Eliezer, makes use of a metaphor. Compromising in a court ruling is like stealing wheat, grinding it, baking it and even separating ḥalla from the stolen dough. The argument being made here is that there are some things that cannot be made holy. Someone who steals cannot make himself into a righteous individual by turning his eyes to the heavens and consecrating part to the priests. Similarly, the judge who cannot trouble himself to ascertain who is right and who is wrong is effectively stealing the money of party who deserves it. He cannot excuse himself by clothing himself in rabbinic judicial garb.
The third approach, which is suggested by Rabbi Meir, connects the verse with Yehudah’s actions. According to Rabbi Meir, Yehudah chose a middle path that didn’t obligate him to take any position at all. Compromise is like lukewarm water, which is neither hot nor cold. Yehudah does not come out in support of Yosef, although he does not want to see him condemned to death. He does not condemn evil acts, but he raises questions about the advisability of this particular evil act. When he says: “What do we gain?” the implication is that there is a better way to take revenge against Yosef – a way that will bring the brothers financial gain, as well. It appears that Yehudah had good intentions. He did not want Yosef to suffer a terrible death, and the suggestion that there could be profit was an excuse to get the brothers to agree. Rather than taking a strong position, Yehudah suggested a compromise that saved Yosef – but also condemned him to loneliness and servitude.
By bringing the Yehudah story into a Talmudic discussion of the merits of compromise, we learn that sometimes the desire to satisfy everyone leads to weak statements when strong statements are necessary. It allows the people in power to avoid responsibility – the responsibility to proclaim truth and to protest evil.
According to the 13th Century commentator, Rabbi Chaim Paltiel, the story of the brothers ties together all of the problems inherent in compromise:
Then Judah said to his brothers, “What do we gain by killing our brother and covering up his blood?”
I heard that when they sat down to eat, each one of them honored his brother, insisting that he be honored with breaking the bread. Yehudah said to them: We are in the midst of fratricide and we are honoring one another?!
According to Rabbi Chaim Paltiel, looking at the entirety of the story – of throwing Yosef into the pit, sitting down to eat, and having Yehudah suggest that instead of leaving Yosef in the pit, he be sold to the Ishmaelites – informs us of a larger truth. He suggests that the meal, which included blessings and honors is what triggered Yehudah to make his suggestion. The hypocrisy of honoring each other – like the hypocrisy of taking ḥalla from stolen dough – is what allowed Yehudah to point out to his brothers the foolishness of their behavior. Yehudah’s problem is that he did not take full advantage of his opportunity, and settled for a compromise that was not much better than the original situation. For that he is punished.
We can conclude that compromise is a valid approach, but only when the circumstances are clear. Only when there is an honest statement explaining the reason for the compromise, and openness about the gap between the compromise and a full solution to the problem at hand, will compromise be deemed appropriate.
