After the flood, God speaks to Noach, bestowing upon him a blessing and conveying to him a series of instructions. These instructions include the issue of meat consumption, which was now permitted for the first time, as we discussed earlier in the week. God tells Noach that he may now eat animal meat and warns against the consumption of meat taken from a live animal. Immediately thereafter, God says, "But for your own lifeblood I will require a reckoning: I will require it of every beast; of man, too, I will require a reckoning for human life" (9:5).
The Ramban expresses uncertainty concerning the meaning of this verse. At first glance, as the Ramban acknowledges, the verse means that God holds all creatures responsible for the death of people. He will "require a reckoning" of every beast that kills a human being, as well as of every man who kills. Although man is permitted to hunt and kill animals for consumption, animals were not permitted to do the same to humans, and they are in fact punished for doing so. This would mean, of course, that the concept of punishment and retribution applies even to animals. Even they are held accountable for their wrongdoing. However, as the Ramban notes, this seems hardly tenable, given the simple fact that animals lack the wisdom and understanding necessary to justify reward or punishment for their conduct. He speculates that perhaps there is a "gezeirat ha-Melekh" – a divine decree – that animals who kill people are killed. The Ramban's formulation suggests that he denied the possibility of applying the familiar concept of reward and punishment to animals. At most, this verse establishes that for reasons beyond our comprehension, God decrees death upon animals that kill people. The Ramban suggests that the halakha of "shor ha-niskal" – requiring the "execution" of an ox who kills a human being, perhaps reflects this concept.
The Ramban then proceeds to suggest a second interpretation of the verse, by which it does not speak at all of the accountability of animals for their conduct. According to the Ramban's second reading, the verse means that God will punish killers "mi-yad kol chaya" – at the hand of animals, by sending animals after them to kill them. Abarbanel follows this approach, as well, and explains that Noach and his family may have feared that in the aftermath of the flood, any disagreement that might erupt between two people and end in bloodshed may undermine their efforts to replenish the earth's population. Given that only a handful of people survived, a single murder could jeopardize the restoration of human life on earth. What more, such a small number of people might find it difficult to establish an effective judicial system capable of deterring potential killers. God therefore warned that murderers will be held accountable for their crimes, if not by the human court, than at least by God, who has many means at His disposal for executing judgment – such as the beasts of prey.
Later the Ramban proposes yet a third possible reading, one which is found already in Rabbenu Sa'adya Gaon's commentary. The word "edrosh" (translated above as "I will require reckoning") may be interpreted not as a reference to retribution, but rather to prevention. The verse would then mean not that God will hold animals responsible for killing people, but that He will restrain them. As the Keli Yakar explains in his comments to an earlier verse (9:2), the permission granted to people to partake of animal meat necessitated instilling within animals a degree of fear of humans. Cattle would not walk obediently to the slaughter had the Almighty not implanted within them a certain nature and character engendering this otherwise peculiar behavior. Therefore, as God allows Noach and his children to eat animal meat, He also guarantees them that the animals will not turn against mankind in response.
In any event, the Ramban and Rabbenu Sa'adya Gaon appear to deny the concept of reward and punishment with respect to animals. This is also the position of the Seforno, who offers a slightly different interpretation, claiming that "mi-yad kol chaya edreshenu" means that God will rescue deserving human beings from beasts of prey.
The Radak, by contrast, upholds the straightforward meaning of the verse and acknowledges that animals, like hu, are subject to the doctrine of reward and punishment. He draws evidence from two verses in the Nevi'im, one referring to reward and the other to punishment. We read in Sefer Melakhim I (13) of the prophet who disobeys God's warning not to spend any time in the city of Bet-El. As punishment for staying in the city to eat, he is devoured by a lion, which, oddly enough, does not devour his donkey. The Radak explains that God spared the donkey in reward for having served the prophet of God, thus proving that God rewards animals. As for the concept of retribution for animals, the prophet Chabakuk (2:17) declares, "the plundering of animals shall destroy them." The Radak explains this to mean that animals that bring death and destruction upon human beings are ultimately punished for their violent behavior.
Rav Hirsch, in his commentary, likewise explains this verse to mean that God will punish animals for killing human beings. He adds, however, "How God exercises His jurisdiction over the animal world lies beyond our ken." He, too, points to the law of "shor ha-niskal" as an expression of this notion, but claims that we cannot possibly understand the workings of reward and punishment with respect to animals. Thus, even if such a concept exists, it does operate along the same lines as the familiar doctrine of reward and punishment regarding human beings.