Since the Torah is the word of God, we believe that no part of it is superfluous. Therefore, when a halachic issue reappears in the Torah, after it has already been taught, our Rabbis took pains to discover why it required repetition. Such is the case, in this weeks Parasha, with a group of verses that deal with the law concerning a thief that when caught swore falsely. When he finally chooses to repent, and admits his sin, he must bring a sacrifice to atone for his wrongdoing, and must add to the original value stolen, an additional fifth. Because this case includes the bringing of a sacrifice, it was already taught within that context at the end of Parashat Vayikra (Vayikra 5:20-26). Its reiteration in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 5:5-10) seems both superfluous and out of place.
Our Rabbis point to two issues, which were not included in Parashat Vayikra, but are taught in the version which appears in Parashat Naso. Firstly, this halacha only applies to one who admitted his wrongdoing of his own accord. If, however, it is proven in court that he actually stole, and the defendant did not admit his guilt, he is not obligated to pay the additional fifth, or bring a sacrifice. Secondly, we are taught the halacha concerning the case of one that steals from a convert that has no children. When someone that has been harmed financially passes away before justice has been done, the guilty party must pay the person's inheritors, that is, his relatives. Therefore, since halachikally, one that converts is completely new to his surroundings, and his biological family does not inherit him, his is the only case where it is impossible to return the money to inheritors. The Torah teaches us (verse 8) that in such a case, the money must be given to the Kohanim (plural of Kohen) that are then serving in the Temple. This is an extremely exceptional law, from which we may learn many things.
We are accustomed to different types of laws within the Halacha. Those that relate to monetary disputes and cases of criminality, and those that relate to ritualistic aspects of religion. It is therefore surprising to see the Kohen made use of in this context, as one that receives the payment for a theft, where no inheritor exists. The verse says that the payment given to God is for the Kohen (verse 8). This means that God gives it to the Kohen. In effect, the thief owes this money to God. Similarly, the previous law learnt, that the person has to own up in order to be obligated, is out of the ordinary. Generally speaking, one that is indicted in court, takes the full measure of punishment irrelevant of whether he admits his guilt. If anything, owning up may lessen the punishment (the law of kefel). It is therefore interesting that in this case the thief must admit that he stole and swore untruthfully in order to be obligated to pay the extra fifth and bring the sacrifice.
Concerning this last point, the fact that here the obligation to bring a sacrifice is connected to the false oath, connects the issue of ritual even to the additional payment of a fifth. A sacrifice is brought out of one's free will. The sacrifice relates to a false oath. This is not only a monetary issue, but the use of God's name in vain. Due to the ritualistic nature of this sin and the repentive nature of the sacrifice, it is necessary to admit the sin. This is not like any other case of being accused in court.
This does not suffice to explain why one must pay the Kohen, in a case where the convert that one stole from has no inheritor. Here we appreciate that the boundary between ritual and monetary issues is generally overly stressed. Whenever one steals, one sins against God. The obligation to compensate is not only due to the violation of the rights of the other, but also because of the fact that a crime has been committed for which the perpetrator must be held accountable. You are responsible for your actions irrelevant of whether any human being is able to present a claim against you. In a case where there is no claimant, God insists that one offer the compensation to Him. In effect, the monetary compensation can be viewed as an obligation before God, which, whenever possible, is collected by the harmed party. But it is not dependent on the legal claim of that party for compensation. In any case, God expects one that has harmed another to understand that he must do something to mend the situation. This may be the difference between an ethic of rights, and one of obligations and responsibility.
There may be another issue here, which may explain why these laws are taught in the context of Parashat Naso. God takes responsibility for those members of society that are weak and vulnerable. The convert, that has left his family, is alone. Therefore, one that steals from him has affronted God, who has taken the convert into His protection.
Parashat Naso begins with the final touches of the arrangement of the camps. We are then commanded to make sure lepers are not left to move within the camp (Bamidbar 5:1-4). Later we deal with the sotah (Bamidbar 5:11-31) and the nazir (Bamidbar 6:1-21), both of which can be understood as cases of people that, either in a negative or positive way, are unable to fit into their social context (an idea for which I am indebted to my mother). Within this context we are told that, one who steals from a convert, who does not necessarily have sufficient social protection, is held responsible by God. He pays reparations to the priest in the temple because it is God that demands it of him.
Courtesy of Yeshivat Har Etzion - www.etzion.org.il